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American "shock therapy" led to an unprecedented collapse of Russia

Yeltsin's "hard years" and its impact on the financial situation and the spiritual and moral state of Russia have not yet received an objective, truthful and comprehensive assessment in our historical literature and in the media, although a lot has been written about it. It has not been properly disclosed to the people what external and internal forces were behind Yeltsin's "reforms" and determined their nature and direction. And this is understandable: the neo-liberals who came to power are by no means interested in the truth about how their policies led to the collapse of Russia. At one of the meetings at the Academy of Sciences, I happened to hear the following opinion: "We are still waiting for such a 20th Congress, from which the whole world will gasp."

What happened to Russia in the 90s? Let's start with the influence of an external factor. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the coming to power in Russia of a new "elite" headed by B. Yeltsin were perceived by the ruling circles of the United States as the emergence of exceptionally favorable geopolitical conditions for the implementation of the idea of ​​a world "American empire". To do this, they had to solve the next task - to remove Russia from the American path as an important subject of world politics.

To this end, the Clinton administration developed a new foreign policy doctrine called Russia's New Containment Policy. As a matter of fact, it was a continuation of the Cold War policy with the use not of military, but of "indirect methods of influence" on Russia. Even employees of the German Foreign Ministry took this US course with bewilderment. In the German officialdom Internationale Politik, they wrote in October 2001: “There is now no basis for a strategy of “new containment” and “negative impact in a mild form” or a strategy of “selective cooperation” with respect to Russia. Russia poses no danger. It is an important partner with, as before, a great impact on security in Europe and Asia.”

Instead of following the wonderful principles of the Charter of Paris signed by all European countries and the United States itself on November 27, 1990 after the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany and aimed at creating peace, security, universal cooperation and prosperity in Europe, Washington chose to continue the course of "indirect destructive impact”, this time in relation to Russia.

A special role in achieving the goals of the new American strategy was assigned to the Yeltsin regime, which was advised by more than 300 American advisers, among whom were many CIA employees. The Russian press cited many testimonies about how Russian politics were managed during the "new containment" of Russia. Former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov, who was well aware of the secrets of the then politics, wrote that Yeltsin voluntarily agreed to the role of a US puppet. "Through various tools" he coordinated with the Americans "at the highest political level" the composition of the government, the political, economic, social course of the state, its foreign policy.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, having published in December 1997 IMF directives to the Chernomyrdin government, raised a legitimate question: “Why does Russia need its own government?” The editor-in-chief of this newspaper, Vitaly Tretyakov, wrote in the article “The Government of Slaves”: “Let's call a spade a spade: we are essentially talking about external management of at least the economy of our country. Let smart people do this, but, firstly, they are not citizens of Russia, and secondly, no one elected or appointed them within the Russian Federation, that is, Comdessus and Wolfensohn are absolutely not responsible to anyone in our country. This is how the bankrupts are managed... In the Kremlin, there are serfs who have temporarily burst into power.”

It was about a team consisting of Yeltsin, Gaidar, Chubais, Berezovsky, Gusinsky, Gref, Abramovich, Chernomyrdin, Kozyrev and many other nouveaux riches. What could be expected, for example, from Chubais, a member of the closed Bilderberg club created by representatives of the American financial oligarchy in 1954? This club has become an important link in "world power" along with the Trilateral Commission, established by the Rockefeller, Morgan and Rothschild group in 1974, as well as the American Council on Foreign Relations and other similar organizations involved in the development of geopolitical problems in the interests of the "world elite" of the United States. The Bilderberg Club included such prominent politicians as H. Kissinger, Z. Brzezinski, D. Bush, a number of major financiers and industrialists. Apart from Chubais, I. Ivanov, who was under Yeltsin the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the secretary of the Security Council and became a member of the board of directors of LUKOIL, was elected from Russia.

Using Yeltsin and his team, the Clinton administration hoped to create material and spiritual poverty in Russia, a state of destruction of its statehood, economy, science, education, armed forces, to prevent the country's revival, to turn it into a raw materials, oil and gas appendage of the West and to put the country's security in direct dependence on the price of oil and gas in the world market. The best way to achieve these goals was considered the introduction of "capitalism with American characteristics" in Russia.

It was a disastrous path for the country. It brought uncontrollability of the economy and social processes in the country. The period of “initial accumulation of capital”, which the countries of the West went through more than 300 years ago, was marked in Russia by the unbridled element of the market, wild arbitrariness and impunity for economic crimes encouraged from above. With incredible speed, a state of general poverty was created in the country. At the beginning of 1992, the ruble and government securities were completely devalued in an instant, Russian citizens and enterprises lost their savings, tax collection fell to a minimum, after which all the troubles of Russia followed. The vast majority of its national wealth was transferred for next to nothing (“a penny for a ruble”, as Clinton adviser Strobe Talbot wrote) to all sorts of crooks in order to foster a financial oligarchy closely associated with the United States and American proteges in influential state structures.

The American "shock therapy" led to an unprecedented collapse of Russia - the paralysis of its production due to criminal privatization and the lack of solvent demand of the population, more than half of which was below the poverty line, overflow of the financial oligarchy, the shadow economy and crime of huge financial resources and national wealth of Russia abroad ; mass flight from poverty to the West, mainly in the USA, scientists, cultural figures, technical intelligentsia; the collapse of the armed forces, the undermining of scientific, technical and educational potential, the decline of agriculture, the impossibility of modernizing unacceptably outdated (70-80%) industrial equipment.

Russia was gripped by a demographic crisis. The comments on the preliminary results of the 2002 population census, prepared for the meeting of the Government of the Russian Federation, said: “The extinction of the Russian people is going on at a monstrous pace ... An absolutely planned, well-calculated depopulation of the Russian population is taking place.”

There were many calls in the media to the legislative and executive authorities to come to their senses, to think about their own national interests, to stop pursuing a policy of destroying Russia. There was no shortage of appeals to the European public about the destructive actions of the Yeltsin regime. Thus, in the “Appeal to the German public”, signed along with me by Lev Kopelev, Yuri Afanasyev, Vadim Belotserkovsky, Sergey Kovalev, Grigory Vodolazov, Dmitry Furman and other representatives of the Russian intelligentsia and published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on December 19, 1996 and in Deutsch -Russische Zeitung in February 1997, said: “It is with bitterness and indignation that we observe how the German government in every conceivable way supports the anti-democratic regime that has arisen in our country in all its cruel and illegal actions and how most of the German media, voluntarily or unwittingly, tries not to notice the deep crisis that has engulfed Russia.

We cannot imagine that the German leadership is not sufficiently informed about this crisis. Many people in Russia even suspect that the West, including Germany, is giving Yeltsin unconditional support, because they hope with his help to definitively relegate Russia to the rank of weak states. With strong condemnation and the threat of economic sanctions from the democratic states, the Yeltsin team would hardly have dared, between October and December 1993, to overthrow the Constitution and establish an authoritarian regime, unleash a monstrous war in Chechnya and hold the recent anti-democratic elections, that is, to act in such a way that this predetermined the escalation of the crisis in Russia.

The catastrophe is developing on its own: that is the only way to characterize the situation in our country now. The economic policy of the caste around Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin turned a thin layer of the old communist nomenklatura and "new Russians" into unimaginably rich, plunged the vast majority of industry into a state of stagnation, and the majority of the population into poverty. In property relations, the gulf between the class of rich and poor is now much deeper than the one that caused the October Revolution in the past.

This appeal, like many others, was ignored by the ruling circles of Western European countries. On the one hand, they were under the heel of the United States and did not dare to object to supporting the Yeltsin regime, on the other hand, there were many supporters of the maximum weakening of Russia in Western Europe. There was Cold War inertia and fears that Russia would again become a powerful power and return to the expansive politics from which it strongly dissociated itself during the reforms of the 1980s.

When analyzing the results of the activities of the Yeltsin team throughout the 1990s, one involuntarily gets the impression that the occupation authorities were operating in Russia. Economists calculated at the time that it would take 20 to 30 years to eliminate the disastrous consequences of "shock therapy". The damage from it was compared with that which was inflicted on the country during the Second World War.

This opinion is still held by many Russian experts. Thus, Academician Nikolai Shmelev, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in his article “Common Sense and the Future of Russia: Yes or No?” wrote: “Today, hardly any of the realistically thinking people will dare to say that in the foreseeable 15-20 years we will be able to repair all the damage caused by the current “time of troubles”. Over the past two decades, Russia has lost half of its industrial potential and, unless urgent measures are taken, due to obsolescence of equipment, the remaining half will be lost in the next 7-10 years. At least a third of agricultural land has been taken out of circulation, about 50% of the cattle population has been put under the knife. According to some experts, over the same period, up to a third of its "brains" left the country. Science, applied research and design developments, and the system of vocational training are in a dilapidated state. Over the past two decades, not a single new large industrial enterprise has been built in Russia (with the exception of the Sakhalin project), not a single power plant, not a single railway or highway of serious importance.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that the American billionaire Soros, speaking at the international forum in Davos on January 27, 2013, drew attention to the deplorable state of the Russian economy. But he did not name those who contributed to this. Prominent American researcher Stephen Cohen spoke about this in his book America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia. He wrote about the disastrous consequences of the American policy of destroying Russia. He introduced his assessment of this policy to a wide circle of Russian readers in the article “The United States is pursuing an unreasonable policy towards Russia”: “The American state has been participating in the internal affairs of Russia since the end of the Cold War, and it has not brought anything good. The US should just shut up, go home and mind their own business... These are bad times for Russia, bad times for Russo-American relations, and I don't see anything getting better."

In 1996, a group of prominent Russian and American economists, concerned about the economic situation in Russia, addressed the Russian president with a condemnation of the policy of "shock therapy" and with a proposal for a new economic program that could lead the country out of a crisis fraught with dire consequences. From the Russian side, the appeal was signed by Academicians L. Abalkin, O. Bogomolov, V. Makarov, S. Shatalin, Yu. , M. Ingriligator, M. Poumer. In particular, the appeal suggested the following:

The Russian government should play a much more important role in the transition to a market economy. The policy of non-intervention of the state, which is part of the "shock therapy", has not justified itself. The government should replace it with a program in which the state assumes the main role in the economy, as is the case in the modern mixed economies of the USA, Sweden, Germany.

- "Shock therapy" had horrendous social consequences, including a huge increase in the number of absolutely poor people, poor health and life expectancy, the destruction of the middle class. The government should actively work to restructure the structure of industry.

Serious government measures must be taken to prevent the process of criminalization of the economy. Taking advantage of government non-intervention, criminal elements are filling the void. There was a transition not to a market, but to a criminalized economy. The state must reverse this and eliminate the cancer of crime in order to create a stable business climate and stimulate investment in production.

The state must revive consumer demand by increasing pensions and wages, promote the formation of sufficient funds for social needs and provide support for the health care system, education, ecology, science, which in general could protect Russia's two great assets - its human capital and natural resources.

It would be wise for the government to use the revenues from foreign trade in gas and oil not to import food and luxury goods, but to modernize outdated factories. It is necessary to ensure that the rent from the exploitation of natural resources turns into state revenues.

New policies require patience. The transition of the economy to a system of market relations takes time, otherwise disaster cannot be avoided. The architects of "shock therapy" did not recognize this; the results, as expected, caused a deep crisis.

These were the main aspects of the adjustment of reforms for Russia, developed by world-famous economists. But the Yeltsin regime did not pay any attention to the recommendations of the "economic wise men." Unfortunately, his followers completely ignored them. By the way, we note that the Pope also condemned the supporters of "capitalist neo-liberalism" in one of the speeches he delivered during his trip to Cuba in January 1998.

In this regard, one episode is very indicative. Chubais, having familiarized himself with the program of "economic wise men", hurried to Washington, visited the State Department and protested in connection with the program, which could put an end to the entire policy of the Yeltsin team. The US State Department reacted positively to Chubais' intervention, condemning the program and the participation of American scientists in its development.

Gaidar, Chubais and others like them tried to justify themselves by saying that they wanted to do away with the communist regime in one fell swoop and prevent its return. In fact, they did everything to destroy and plunder Russia in one fell swoop, which is what the Clinton administration planned. Strobe Talbott, who developed Clinton's policy towards Russia, wrote: “With the sincere approval of most Western experts, they (Gaidar and his team. - Approx. Aut.) believed that such tough measures were necessary for two reasons: first, to create conditions for the inevitable solvency of the Russian state sooner or later, and secondly, to break the back of the Soviet leviathan.” As the saying goes, "they were aiming for the Soviet Union, but ended up in Russia."

The greatest historical paradox of the late 20th century is that in less than a decade, one superpower, the United States, massacred another superpower, Russia, without firing a single shot or shedding a single drop of blood from its soldiers. History has never known this before.

Leaving the post of President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin asked for forgiveness from the Russian people in his farewell speech, but did not say for what kind of sins. For the fact that in December 1991 he signed a declaration in Belovezhye on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, thereby violating the will of the people, expressed in favor of preserving the country in a referendum in March 1991? Or for the fact that in 10 years of his reign he brought Russia to the brink of disaster? Or for the fact that, having seized power in the Russian state, he began to serve the American "behind the scenes"? There is no forgiveness for all this. This could be done by Herostratus, which history has not yet known.

Ladygina Anastasia Olegovna

Faculty of Economics Southern Federal University Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation

Abstract: From the mid-80s to the 90s, new shadow norms and shadow organizations were accumulating in Russia, conditions were created for shadow economic activity. In the second half of the nineties, the shadow economy was institutionalized. The article discusses the causes of this phenomenon in the period under review.

Key words: shadow economy, transitional period, institute, state

Transformation of the shadow economy in Russia in the 90's

Ladygina Anastasia Olegovna

the Faculty of Economics, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation

Abstract: Since the mid 80's to the 90's in Russia the accumulation of new shadow norms and shadow organizations, the conditions for informal economic activities have been created. In the second half of the nineties the institutionalization of the shadow economy occurred. The author demonstrates the causes of this phenomenon in the reporting period.

Keywords: shadow economy, transitional period, institute, polity

A review of the shadow economy in the planned economy shows that the preconditions for its dawn were in place by the early 1970s. It included people engaged in economic activities using state property. They had a special relationship with criminal subjects, outlined at the turn of the sixties by a certain framework. The state system of trade was thoroughly permeated with the system of the shadow economy. This was the initial stage of the emergence and spread of this phenomenon, in which there were no institutions of shadow economic activity.

As time went. The country was accumulating new shadow norms and shadow organizations, creating the best conditions for shadow activities. In the 1990s, the fundamental value orientations of the population were significantly deformed, a shadow lifestyle became commonplace for a significant part of it, and the authority of state power in the eyes of society fell. A considerable number of people have entered the path of crime.

By the mid-90s of the last century, the scale of the phenomenon under consideration reached 41.6% of the country's gross domestic product. Compared with other post-socialist countries, this figure is small. But at the same time, it should be mentioned that by this period the share of the shadow economy in some countries has noticeably decreased, which cannot be said about our country.

The data in Table 1 show an assessment of the dynamics of the size of the shadow economy in countries with economies in transition in 1989, 1992 and 1995. According to them, in turn, it is clear that by the mid-nineties the share of the shadow economy in Russia, as well as in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, increased.

Table 1 - The scale of the shadow economy in post-socialist countries according to the method of D. Kaufman - A. Kaliberda, in % of GDP

The fact that in the second half of the nineties shadow activity began to turn into a special social institution is evidenced by data showing the share of the shadow economy in GDP production, which in 1996 reached 46%, and in 1997 and 1998, according to various estimates, the volume of shadow economy was from 50 to 70% of Russia's GDP.

Various factors influenced the growth of the shadow sector in Russia during the period under review. But I would like to highlight the obvious miscalculations and mistakes in the implementation of economic reforms by state bodies.

First, state structures at that time lost the ability not only for strategic, but also for operational management of the economy. The existing vacuum of management was filled with mafia-shadow connections and relations, the mores and customs of wild capitalism, which is characterized by enrichment through speculative operations, deceit and extortion, the widespread personal, clan relations that merge with mafia structures, and so on.

Secondly, in the course of the implementation of the economic reform model, which includes mass privatization, rapid price liberalization, one-time "opening" of the economy to the outside world, restrictive monetary policy, severe tax pressure on production, a destimulating mechanism of legal economic activity has developed, which displaces its shadow to this day.

Finally, with the connivance of the state, a social structure with a high shadow potential has been formed in Russia. A large proportion of the population classified as poor, unemployed and fictitiously employed, the social bottom, refugees from the hot spots of the former USSR, demobilized from the army and in a state of post-war shock are a breeding ground for the shadow economy.

Both the state itself and its bodies have become active participants in shadow operations. Its representatives profited from privatization, sold natural resources, built financial pyramids, and provoked financial crises.

It is also necessary to pay attention to such reasons for the rapid development of the shadow economy in the 1990s as:

a) economic:

The catastrophic destruction of the entire system of the national economy in connection with the liquidation of the USSR. These include: rupture of cooperation ties, barter, overstocking and shortages, non-payments, as well as mass theft;

The impoverishment of the majority of the population against the backdrop of the fabulous unjust enrichment of a group of people from President Yeltsin's entourage;

The collapse of the country's financial system, namely: an exorbitant budget deficit, hyperinflation, the transition to cash, including foreign currency, and money surrogates, a pyramid of government borrowing, and so on;

Liquidation of the state system of economic and financial administration and control;

Establishment of prohibitive (up to 50% of GDP) tax burden;

b) legal:

The emergence of a legal vacuum, that is, the erroneous introduction of the principle “everything that is not prohibited by law” into law enforcement practice in conditions when the old laws no longer worked, and new ones did not yet exist;

Formation of a significant criminal sector in the economy;

The destruction of the law enforcement system by constant reorganizations;

Corrupt use of legislative, executive, and law enforcement agencies in the interests of the shadow economy;

Formation of legal nihilism among citizens;

c) socio-political:

The destruction of the ideological foundations of public life, that is, the entire system of state ideology was ousted;

At this stage, the alignment of forces has fully developed. All the main sections of the market were clearly divided and controlled by one of the oligarchic financial and industrial groups along with the corrupt officials who patronize them. The rest of the criminal "competitors" were expelled from the economic niches they occupied.

At the turn of the century, organized economic crime in Russia ceased to be criminal and through oligarchic financial and industrial groups became predominantly bureaucratic and governmental. The criminal elements gradually lost their power more and more.

Thus, the period under review is a stage of formation and solid strengthening of shadow economic activity in Russia. There are many reasons for this. And they need to be known in order to understand how this phenomenon arose and how it can be ousted from the socio-economic system of our country.

Bibliography:

1. Tarasov M. Strengthening the role of the state in limiting the shadow economy in Russia // Problems of theory and practice of management: International journal. M.: 2002. No. 2
2. Burov V.Yu. Determining the scale of the shadow economy // Bulletin-economist. 2012. No. 4
3. Latov Yu.V. Economy outside the law: essays on the theory and history of the shadow economy. M., 2001
4. Gamza V. A. Shadow economy and corruption: how to break the vicious circle? // Investigator. Federal edition. 2007. No. 11
5. Lunev V.V. Crime and shadow economy. 2005. No. 1
6. Gerasin A.N. Shadow processes in the economy of modern Russia. M., 2006

Economic reforms in Russia (1990s)— economic reforms implemented in Russia in the 1990s. These include, in particular, price liberalization, foreign trade liberalization and privatization.

background

In the 1960s - 1980s, the USSR increased the production and export of oil and gas. Export of oil and oil products increased from 75.7 million tons. in 1965 to 193.5 million tons. in 1985; exports to the dollar zone amounted to 36.6 and 80.7 million tons, respectively. According to M. V. Slavkina, the foreign exchange earnings received as a result of exports were spent mainly not on the modernization of the economy (acquisition of high technologies or re-equipment of equipment), but on the import of food and consumer goods. According to M. V. Slavkina, import purchases of grain, meat, clothing and footwear took more than 50% (in some years up to 90%) of foreign exchange earnings. According to S. G. Kara-Murza, food imports amounted to no more than 7% of total imports). The share of imported equipment in the industry of the USSR, according to V. Shlykov, in 1990 was 20%.

In the mid-1980s, against the background of falling oil prices (from $30.35 per barrel in October 1985 to $10.43 in March 1986) and a 30% reduction in export revenues, the budget deficit began to grow. Thus, the budget deficit, which in 1985 amounted to 17-18 billion rubles, in 1986 almost tripled. Since the budget deficit was financed by the emission of money, its growth - at fixed prices - led to an increase in the deficit in the consumer market.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU V. Medvedev wrote in 1994 that by 1989 a “real economic crisis” had developed, which had a significant impact on the consumer market with a disruption in food supplies and the rush demand of the population, including for essential products. According to Medvedev, the money incomes of the population were not controlled, an inflationary spiral was growing, and the 1987 economic reform program was “virtually buried”.

At the same time, ex-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. I. Ryzhkov stated in 2010 that the deficit was deliberately created by some government officials (in particular, according to him, Yeltsin initiated the simultaneous repair of 24 tobacco factories, which provoked a shortage of tobacco).

In mid-November 1991, Yeltsin headed the first reform government in Russia, after which he signed a package of ten presidential decrees and government orders that outlined concrete steps towards a market economy. At the end of November 1991, Russia assumed obligations for the debts of the USSR.

According to Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. M. Polterovich, the shortage of goods observed at the end of 1991 was “largely generated by the expectation of future changes, in particular, a sharp increase in prices as a result of liberalization, which was actually announced back in October 1991.”

A number of scholars in the early 1990s warned of the danger of "barbaric capitalism" coming as a result of market reforms, at least in the coming years.

Chronology

• December 1991 - Free Trade Decree
• January 1992 - price liberalization, hyperinflation, start of voucher privatization
• July-September 1993 - the fall in inflation, the abolition of the USSR ruble (currency reform).
• January 1, 1998 - 1000-fold denomination of the ruble
• since August 17, 1998 - economic crisis, default on domestic obligations (GKO), a fourfold collapse of the ruble

Price liberalization

At the beginning of 1992, a radical economic reform began to be carried out in the country, in particular, on January 2, 1992, the Decree of the President of the RSFSR "On Measures to Liberalize Prices" came into force. Already in the first months of the year, the market began to fill with consumer goods, but the monetary policy of issuing money (including in the former Soviet republics) led to hyperinflation: a sharp decline in real wages and pensions, depreciation of bank savings, and a sharp drop in living standards.

According to Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences N.P. Shmelev, Yegor Gaidar actually robbed the country by not introducing an inflation coefficient on deposits in savings banks.

The economy, which got out of control of the government, suffered from financial speculation, the depreciation of the ruble against hard currency. The crisis of non-payments and the replacement of cash payments by barter worsened the general state of the country's economy. The results of the reforms became apparent by the mid-1990s. On the one hand, a diversified market economy began to take shape in Russia, political and economic ties with Western countries improved, and the protection of human rights and freedoms was proclaimed as a priority of state policy. But in 1991-1995. GDP and industrial production fell by more than 20%, the standard of living of the majority of the population fell sharply, investments fell by 70% in 1991-1998.

Liberalization of foreign trade

In 1992, simultaneously with the liberalization of domestic prices, foreign trade was liberalized. It was carried out long before domestic prices reached equilibrium values. As a result, the sale of certain raw materials (oil, non-ferrous metals, fuel) in the face of low export tariffs, the difference between domestic and world prices, and weak customs control has become extremely profitable. As academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. M. Polterovich wrote, with such a profitability of external transactions with raw materials, investments in the development of production lost their meaning, and “the goal was to gain access to foreign trade operations.” According to V. M. Polterovich, “this contributed to the growth of corruption and crime, the growth of inequality, the increase in domestic prices and the decline in production.” Another consequence of trade liberalization has been the flood of cheap imported consumer goods into the Russian market. This flow led to the collapse of the domestic light industry, which by 1998 began to produce less than 10% of the level before the start of reforms.

Privatization

A number of the largest raw material enterprises were privatized at loans-for-shares auctions and passed into the hands of new owners at prices many times lower than their real value. One hundred and forty-five thousand state-owned enterprises were transferred to new owners at a tens of thousands of times lower total cost of only about one billion dollars.

As a result of privatization, a class of so-called "oligarchs" has formed in Russia. At the same time, there is a huge number of people living below the poverty line.

Most of the Russian population has a negative attitude towards the results of privatization. As the data of several opinion polls show, about 80% of Russians consider it illegitimate and are in favor of a complete or partial revision of its results. About 90% of Russians are of the opinion that privatization was carried out dishonestly and large fortunes were acquired dishonestly (72% of entrepreneurs agree with this point of view). According to the researchers, a stable, “almost consensus” rejection of privatization and the large private property formed on its basis has developed in Russian society.

Results of the reforms

• According to Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.D. Nekipelov, the reforms of the 1990s (in particular, the maximum liberalization of economic activity, the arbitrary distribution of state property, financial stabilization due to the severe limitation of aggregate demand) led to the creation of a miserable quasi-market system, the features of which were "unprecedented naturalization economic activity, a steady significant excess of the interest rate on the level of return on capital in the real sector and the inevitable orientation of the entire economy in these conditions to financial and trade speculation and the pilfering of previously created wealth, a chronic fiscal crisis caused by the emergence of a “bad sequence”: “budget deficit - reduction of state expenditures - a decline in production and an increase in non-payments - a reduction in tax revenues - a budget deficit.
• Under the influence of hyperinflation, there was a profound deformation of all cost proportions and the ratio of prices for the products of individual industries, which changed the cost bases of the financial, budgetary, and monetary system. The consumer price index from 1992 to 1995 increased by 1187 times, and nominal wages by 616 times. Tariffs for freight transportation increased over those years by 9.3 thousand times, and the price index for the sale of agricultural products by producers increased only 780 times, 4.5 times less than in industry. The disequilibrium of income and expenditure has reached such a level during the years of transformation that the non-payment mechanism has ceased to cope with its balancing.
• A noticeable impoverishment of almost the majority of the population of Russia in the early 1990s: the standard of living of the bulk of the population decreased by 1.5-2 times in many respects - to the indicators of the 60-70s.
• The structure of industrial production has also changed over the years of transformation. There has been a decline in knowledge-intensive industries, the technical degradation of the economy, and the curtailment of modern technologies. The decline in production in Russia in terms of its scale and duration significantly exceeded all peacetime crises known in history. In mechanical engineering, industrial construction, light industry, the food industry and in many other important industries, production was reduced by 4-5 times, expenditures on scientific research and design development - by 10 times, and in certain areas - by 15-20 times. Raw materials were the main source of export earnings. The share of the service sector has grown, but the share of personal services has decreased, while the share of circulation services has increased. The export of raw materials made it possible to finance priority budgetary needs, but foreign economic relations acted more as a current opportunistic stabilizer of the economy, rather than a mechanism for increasing competitiveness. Foreign loans received by Russia for the transformation and stabilization of the economy were an important means of balancing the budget. In the 15 years that have passed since the beginning of market reforms in Russia, shipbuilding has experienced one of the most significant declines compared to other industries.
• During the transition to a market economy, a labor market appeared, and unemployment increased. According to the methodology of the International Labor Organization (ILO), at the beginning of 2003, 7.1% of the economically active population were unemployed (excluding hidden unemployment). The gap between the minimum and maximum unemployment levels by region was 36 times.
• In late 1998 and early 1999, a trend towards economic growth emerged. After the devaluation of August 1998, the competitiveness of imports was sharply reduced, which increased the demand for domestic goods in the food industry and other industries. The most important factor in economic growth was the growth in production volumes at all enterprises of the fuel and energy complex, where they sought to compensate for losses from falling prices on world markets - exports decreased in value during 1998, in physical volumes - increased.
• The liberalization of pricing removed the problems of commodity shortages of the late 80s, but caused a decrease in the living standards of the majority of the population, hyperinflation (liquidation of savings).
• A number of economists believe that the reason for the economic recovery in Russia (and other countries of the former USSR) since 1999 is, first of all, the transition from a planned to a market economy, carried out in the 1990s.
• According to Janos Kornai, doctor of economics, Harvard University professor, Russia has seen the development of "an absurd, perverted and extremely unjust form of oligarchic capitalism." Ruslan Grinberg, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, director of the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, also noted that as a result of the policy of Yeltsin and the reformers, "oligarchic capitalism" was formed.
• Price liberalization and new tax policies have had a devastating effect on private enterprise. In 1992, in Russia, the number of small enterprises in the sphere of production dropped sharply.
• Price liberalization and liberalization of foreign trade led to high rates of price growth in the Russian economy, as well as to cardinal and negative changes in price proportions for the development of the economy.

Science and R&D

During the reforms, funding for science and R&D was sharply reduced. In 1992-1997, spending on science was reduced by 6 times. In 1990, spending on science amounted to 5.5-6% of GDP, and in 1992 - 1.9%. The publication of the Russian Academy of Sciences noted that this was a conscious installation:

During the years of reforms, the social status of a scientific worker worsened, and the prestige of scientific work decreased. The wages of scientific workers were significantly reduced. HSE employee Natalia Kutepova notes:

At the same time, the payment of small earnings was often delayed.

Two years after the start of reforms, only in academic science there was a reduction in the number of employees by 32%. The reduction in the number of scientific workers was associated, in particular, with a decrease in wages, a decline in production throughout the 1990s, structural shifts in the economy (a decrease in demand for high-tech products).

Director of the Institute for the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences Sergey Rogov wrote in 2010:

According to him, “for the last twenty years we have lived off the scientific and technological backlog created in the Soviet Union.”

Dan. A. E. Varshavsky and D.T. n. O. S. Sirotkin believe that in 1990-1997 the scientific potential of the country decreased by 35-40%. The monetary value of the loss of scientific potential during the transition period (until 1997), according to their calculations, is at least 60-70 billion dollars.

In sectors of the economy

Agro-industrial complex

The reforms have led to a significant reduction in agricultural production. During the years of reforms, there has been a reduction in sown areas, grain harvest, and livestock. So, in 1990-1999, the number of cattle decreased from 45.3 to 17.3 million, the number of pigs - from 27.1 to 9.5 million.

Grain production for 1990-1999 decreased from 113.5 to 47.8 million tons, milk - from 41.4 to 15.8 million tons. The area of ​​agricultural land decreased from 202.4 to 152.7 million hectares, the area under crops - from 112.1 to 73.0 million hectares.

As a result of price liberalization and privatization of enterprises of the final stage of agro-industrial production (storage, processing and transportation of agricultural products), which are regional monopolists, in the very first years from the start of reforms, retail prices for meat and milk increased by about 4 times more than meat processing plants, dairy plants and intermediaries paid the villagers.

During the years of reforms, the authorities carried out fragmentation and a change in the organizational type of most large agricultural enterprises (collective farms and state farms).

In animal husbandry, there was a regression in technology and sanitation. The “State report on the state of health of the population of the Russian Federation in 1992” (M., 1993) noted: “The expansion of the area of ​​synanthropic trichinosis and the increasing number of people infected are alarming ... The incidence of trichinosis, which has an outbreak character, was recorded in 40 administrative territories of the Russian Federation. All outbreaks of trichinosis resulted from the uncontrolled trade in home-slaughtered pork without a sanitary and veterinary examination ... The forecast for the incidence of helminthiases in the population is unfavorable. The lack of therapeutic agents negates the long-term efforts of health care institutions and the sanitary and epidemiological service to improve the foci of helminthiases. The development and intensification of individual farms (private pig breeding, growing vegetables, herbs, berry crops using untreated sewage for fertilizer) leads to contamination of the soil, vegetables, berries, invasion of meat and meat products.

Transport

The report of the Interstate Council on Antimonopoly Policy of 2008 noted:

Social Consequences

Declining health and rising mortality

The report of the Commission on Women, Family and Demography under the President of the Russian Federation "On the current state of mortality in the population of the Russian Federation" noted: “From 1989 to 1995, the number of deaths in Russia increased from 1.6 million people in 1989 to 2.2 million people in 1995, that is, 1.4 times”. In addition, the report stated: “The unprecedented increase in mortality in Russia in the 90s takes place against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in the health of the population”. The report concluded that the most tangible victim of the reforms was the population and its health.

The most negative consequence of the systemic, primarily economic crisis in Russia was the increase in mortality. In the 1990s the number of deaths exceeded the level of the 1980s. by 4.9 million people, and compared with the seventies increased by 7.4 million. If we take the age-specific mortality rates in the 1980s. and the number of deaths at the same ages in the 1990s, then you can get a surplus of deaths in the last decade compared to the previous one. This surplus, or rather supermortality in 1991-2000. amounted to approximately 3-3.5 million people, and together with the losses attributable to the third year of the XXI century - about 4 million people. For comparison, Doctor of Economics. L. L. Rybakovsky from the ISPI RAS cites data that supermortality during the Great Patriotic War, including the death of the population in besieged Leningrad, amounted to approximately 4.2 million people. Among those who died in the peaceful 1990s, the proportion of deaths preventable under other socioeconomic conditions increased. At the same time, the decline in the birth rate in the 1990s. was so significant that analogies with the Great Patriotic War are also appropriate.

Rising crime

"Liberal" reforms, as the researchers note, caused a significant increase in crime in Russia. Factors in the growth of crime were, in particular, the impoverishment of the population, the weakening of the police and the judiciary as a result of underfunding, and the weakening of moral standards.

Organized crime began to play a serious role in the life of the country. Criminals have become more aggressive and cruel, the number of repeated crimes (relapses) has increased. The share of unemployed among convicted criminals for 1990-1999 increased from 17 to 56%.

The edition of ISEPN RAS stated that in Soviet times "the level of crime was at a rather low level", and market reforms led to an increase in crime. Public opinion polls showed that the population was losing a sense of security from criminal encroachments: for example, in 1993-1994, the proportion of people who were very concerned about the growth of crime increased to 64-68%. The publication stated: “In post-Soviet times, most citizens of the country lived in a state of constant concern for their lives, property, the lives of relatives and friends.”

In 1991-1999, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, more than 740 thousand people died as a result of various crimes. At the same time, experts note a high level of latent crime: the real number of crimes was much higher than official statistics. This was due to the fact that the victims or witnesses did not apply to the police, in addition, the police themselves tried to underestimate the number of crimes. The actual number of crimes could be twice as high.

Income stratification

The disparities between sectors of the economy, which arose as a result of liberalization and massive privatization, led to a rapid increase in the differentiation of incomes of the population.

Criticism

Speaking about Russian reformers and the results of their policies, Columbia University professor and Nobel Prize winner in economics Joseph Stiglitz noted: “The greatest paradox is that their views on the economy were so unnatural, so ideologically distorted, that they failed to solve even the narrower task of increasing the rate of economic growth. Instead, they achieved the purest economic downturn. No amount of rewriting history will change that.".

“It is a fact that during the years of reform, the country, in terms of the level of socio-economic development, turned out to be thrown back decades, and in some indicators - in the pre-revolutionary period. Never in the foreseeable period, even after the destruction from the Nazi invasion, has such a long and deep decline in the level of production been observed in almost all sectors of the domestic economy. S. Yu. Glaziev, S. A. Batchikov

Gaidar's economic adviser Jeffrey Sachs later said: “The main thing that let us down was the colossal gap between the rhetoric of the reformers and their real actions ... And, it seems to me, the Russian leadership surpassed the most fantastic ideas of the Marxists about capitalism: they considered that the business of the state is to serve a narrow circle of capitalists, pumping into their pockets as much money as possible and as soon as possible. This is not shock therapy. This is a malicious, premeditated, well-thought-out action, which has as its goal a large-scale redistribution of wealth in the interests of a narrow circle of people..

Industrial development of Russia in the 90s. undergone major qualitative changes. The new leadership of the Russian Federation set the task of restructuring the economy from planned and directive rails to market ones, with the subsequent entry of Russia into the world market. The next step was supposed to accelerate the country's progress towards building an information society.

In the 90s. in Russia there was a privatization of huge state property; a commodity market has developed; the ruble became a partially convertible currency; the formation of the national financial market began; there was a labor market growing from year to year.

However, it was not possible to fully solve the tasks set in the course of economic reforms. The result was a sharp drop in the 1990s. level of both industrial and agricultural production in comparison with the previous time. There were both objective and subjective reasons for this.

The starting conditions for the reforms turned out to be extremely unfavorable. The external debt of the USSR, which was transferred to Russia in 1992, exceeded, according to some estimates, $100 billion. In subsequent years, it has grown significantly. Disproportions in the development of the economy also persisted. The "openness" of the Russian economy to foreign goods and services helped in a short time to eliminate the shortage of goods - the main disease of the Soviet economic system. However, the emerging competition with imported goods, which, due to more favorable economic conditions, are cheaper than similar Russian goods, led to a serious decline in domestic production (only after the 1998 crisis did Russian manufacturers manage to partially reverse this trend in their favor).

The presence of huge subsidized regions of the country remote from the Center (Siberia, the North, the Far East) in the conditions of the emerging market hurt the federal budget, which was unable to cope with the sharply increased costs. The fixed production assets have reached the limit of wear and tear. The rupture of economic ties that followed the collapse of the USSR led to the cessation of the production of many high-quality products. A significant role was also played by the inability to manage in unusual conditions, flaws in the privatization policy, the conversion of many enterprises in connection with the conversion of military production, a sharp reduction in state funding, and a drop in the purchasing power of the population. The global financial crisis of 1998 and the unfavorable conjuncture of foreign markets had a significant negative impact on the country's economy.

Subjective reasons also emerged. In the course of the reforms, their initiators had an erroneous idea that in the transition to a market economy, the role of the state in the economy is weakening. However, historical experience shows that in the conditions of the weakening of the state, social instability is growing and the economy is being destroyed. Only in a strong state does economic stabilization come faster, and reforms lead to economic recovery. The rejection of elements of planning and centralized management occurred at a time when the leading countries were looking for ways to improve it. The copying of Western models of the economy and the lack of a serious study of the specifics of the historical development of one's own country also led to negative results. The imperfection of the legislation created the possibility, without developing material production, to receive super profits by creating financial pyramids, etc.

Production of industrial and agricultural products by the end of the 90s. amounted to only 20-25% of the 1989 level. The unemployment rate rose to 10-12 million people. The orientation of production towards export led to the formation of a new structure of the domestic industry - it was based on enterprises of the mining and manufacturing industries. The country has lost more than 300 billion dollars of exported capital in just 10 years. The curtailment of domestic industrial production led to the beginning of the country's de-industrialization processes. If in the 20th century Russia entered the top ten industrialized countries, then in 2000 it was in 104th place in the world in terms of industrial output per capita, and in the second ten in terms of gross production indicators. In terms of the totality of the main economic indicators, Russia occupied 94th place by this time. According to a number of indicators, Russia now lagged behind not only the developed countries of the West, but also China (three times), India (twice) and even South Korea.

Despite the efforts made in the late 1990s measures to revive the economy and even the emerging growth of industry, the basis of the Russian economy remained the same - dependence on the sale of raw materials and especially oil and natural gas. How dangerous this situation is was clearly demonstrated by the situation associated with the fall in world energy prices in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 20th century

FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY (2000):

The main obstacles to economic growth are high taxes, arbitrariness of officials, rampant crime. The solution to these problems depends on the state. However, a costly and wasteful state cannot lower taxes. A state subject to corruption, with unclear boundaries of competence, will not save entrepreneurs from the arbitrariness of officials and the influence of crime. An inefficient state is the main cause of a long and deep economic crisis...

Social sphere

In the context of a protracted economic crisis, the development of the social sphere was also in a rather painful state. In the context of a sharp reduction in budget revenues, spending on science, education, healthcare, and pensions has decreased by almost 20 times! In the first years of the economic reform, this put the social sphere in an extremely difficult position. By the end of the 1990s, the average salary of researchers amounted to 12-14 dollars a month with a living wage of 50 dollars. Due to lack of funds, long-term planning of scientific work (which was previously carried out 20 years in advance) was stopped.

However, some positive trends have also emerged. For the first time in the country's history, the number of university students was 246 per 10,000 population. However, this figure was made possible thanks to the opening of many private educational institutions, the level of education in many of which remained very low.

Domestic health care was deprived of the opportunity to provide free full-fledged care to patients and by the end of the 90s. occupied the 131st place in the world according to the main most important indicators.

Below the subsistence level were old-age and disability pensions.

Under the pretext of lack of budgetary funds of the authorities in the early 90s. removed from the Constitution the right of citizens to complete secondary education, free housing and medical care.

For 10 years, the social structure of society has noticeably changed. The proportion of rich Russians was 3-5%, the middle class - 12-15%, 40% each - the poor and the poor.

All this required a radical revision of the very foundations of social policy in order to ensure the protection of the population during the transition period. Such a revision began with the election of VV Putin as head of state in 2000.

Demography

The socio-economic situation in the country could not but affect the demographics.

If at the beginning of the XX century. 76% of the country's population were citizens under the age of 50, by the end of the century there were almost the same number of people of retirement and pre-retirement age. The average age of the inhabitants of Russia is approximately 56 years, while, according to forecasts, in the USA and Western Europe it will be 35-40 years in a few years, and in China and Japan - 20-25 years. For 1997-2000 The child population of Russia decreased by 4 million people and amounted to 39 million people. The low standard of living has led to the fact that the percentage of healthy children has been steadily declining, in 2001 there were only 8-10% of such children among junior schoolchildren, 6% of middle school age, and only 5% among high school students.

Since 1993, in Russia, the death rate exceeded the birth rate, and soon the natural population decline reached 1 million people a year. The average life expectancy for women has now become not 75 years (as in 1979), but only 69, for men - not 69, but 56. In 10 years, the population of Russia has decreased by more than 10 million people. If this trend continues, there is a threat of a reduction in the country's population by 2015 by another 22 million people (a seventh of the population of Russia).

To remedy this situation, the Government of the country has taken a whole range of measures to improve the living standards of the population.

FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2000):

If the current trend continues, the survival of the nation will be in jeopardy. We are in real danger of becoming a decrepit nation. Today the demographic situation is one of the alarming ones.

everyday life

The changes taking place in the everyday life of all the main social groups of the population turned out to be swift and radical.

Already in 1992, meat consumption decreased by 80%, milk - by 56%, vegetables - by 84%, fish - by 56% from the level of the already meager 1991. By the summer of 1998, the situation had changed somewhat for the better - consumption the population of basic foodstuffs exceeded some indicators of the pre-reform period, but remained quite low.

The unfolding housing construction helped in a short time to reduce the queues for obtaining municipal housing, but the lack of funds from the population made it impossible to purchase apartments.

The abundance in shops and markets for everyday goods led to lower prices.

The purchase of not only TVs, refrigerators, SV-ovens, but also cars, the construction of small country houses became affordable for the majority of working citizens. The number of private cars only in Moscow by the end of the 90s. amounted to 2.5 million, surpassing the figures of twenty years ago by almost 10 times.

The development of the housing market has led not only to the free sale and purchase of apartments, but also to the emergence of a large number (at least 1 million people) of homeless people who have sold their homes and found themselves on the street.

A new phenomenon in urban life was the emergence of a large number of homeless children (official statistics at the end of the 90s called the figure of 2.5 million people).

Drunkenness, drug addiction, prostitution, and corruption have become a big social problem. The complication of the crime situation, especially in large cities, made it necessary to strengthen the role of the state, its most important institutions in restoring order.

Thus, the socio-economic development of the country in the 90s. was full of contradictions. It reflected the transitional nature of the era experienced by the country.